Hardliners consider 'by-passing' Ahmadinejad

Resalat published an article last week that discussed the notion of by-passing Ahmadinejad in the 2009 election. The news site, which is aligned with conservative clergy in Qom, compared the idea of moving past Ahmadinejad with what some reformists attempted to do under Khatami.

Resalat's article is addressing the current debate in hardline politics which is questioning the viability Ahmadinejad as a candidate in 2009. While leading hardline politicians have not offcicially announced their candidacy for 2009, there remains a strong push for new leadership of the conservative coalition.

However, as Resalat shows, there is also a segment that recognizes the strength that a unity candidate brings to hardline interests. Resalat does not attempt to answer the question definitively, but they do try to keep both options on the table. This is standard political protocal, of course, but it also shows that Ahmadinejad remains an unattractive figure for many in the hardliner (or principlist) movement.

OSC has translated the article. Here's the section of interest:

Now, in the special circumstances which have come about after the 2nd Khordad and following the rise of Ahmadinezhad's principle-ist government the question is, do the principle-ists, in a historical similarity, intend to bypass Ahmadinezhad on the threshold of the tenth elections as the reformists say they do? In order to answer this question, a few facts need to be considered:

1. Ahmadinezhad is one of the principle-ists; logically the whole principle-ist ideology cannot be said to equal the person of Ahmadinezhad.

2. Ahmadinezhad's cabinet is made up of principle-ist forces, but it is not a reflection of all the principle-ists, just as the government too does not claim to be. Put simply, Ahmadinezhad and his cabinet are only a part of the full principle-ist capacity.

3. The principle-ists endorse the principle-ist aspirations of Ahmadinezhad and his cabinet and praise them for their unremitting efforts in advancing these ideals.

4. With reference to the stances published in the media, the principle-ists do not see Ahmadinezhad and his cabinet as being without fault and without cause for criticism, and they have challenged them with their constructive criticism.

5. What is important for the principle-ists is the principle-ist doctrine or ideals, not people. So the ultimate aim is the independence of this viewpoint, not the uncontested sovereignty of individuals, and for this reason they will not hold back for anyone when it comes to strengthening the principle-ist ideology which comes from their religious beliefs.

This is why, based on the concepts described above, the principle-ists will never bypass Ahmadinezhad. However, since principle-ism is constantly evolving, moving on beyond Ahmadinezhad, or in other words arriving at choices which will materialise the ideas of principle-ism with the least amount of damage, is not only possible, it is, logically, a necessity. So, on taking up the seat of leadership, a principle-ist, in being a principle-ist, should never resist the republic of the believers in a way that will bring his righteousness and integrity into question. For this reason, bypassing has no logical meaning amongst the principle-ists because remaining in a post is meaningful only if aspirations are realised and nothing else. The test of principle-ism is at this sensitive stage.

Presidential politics

Reformist politician Mehdi Karrubi has announced the he will run for president in 2009. His announcement comes after months of speculation on whether he would run or step aside to open the way for another bid by former president Mohammad Khatami. Khatami has still not made an official decision regarding his candidacy; however, he has always suggested that he would only run if he was a "unity" candidate for the reformists.

I suggested earlier that Khatami's hesitancy was directly related to the question of Karrubi's candidacy. Being that, Khatami does not want to run against Karrubi and will only run if his leadership of the reformist faction is uncontested. With Karrubi now running, it's not clear if this cancels out a possible run by Khatami in 2009 or not. As I've said, I don' t think Khatami has any intention of running against his rival Karrubi, but if Karrubi should step aside in some behind-the-scenes deal a few months from now, we may yet see Khatami run again.

Regarding the hardliners, Fars reports that Majles Speaker Ali Larijani will not run as a candidate in 2009. Larijani, like Karrubi, has been a rumored candidate for over a year, and after he was elected Majles speaker many commentators suggested that he was in the best position to challenge Ahmadinejad next year. While he seems to have rejected that notion for now, I'm not putting much stock into it, as it's not yet clear how the hardliners will handle the 2009 presidential race.

It's hard to see Ahmadinejad being a unity candidate, as his economic policies alone have weakened his popularity and have made him an easy target. And while there has been much to do about Ayatollah Khamenei's apparent endorsement of Ahmadinjad's next term (telling Ahmadinejad to imagine being president for another term when formulating his policies) I'm not sold on the idea. Khamenei may indeed support Ahmadinejad in the next election, and he may convince others (such as Larijani) not to challenge him, however, Khamenei also has to weigh the interests of the marjas in Qom, the bazari merchants, and other powerful figures in making his decision. If there is a collective push from the principlist faction for a new candidate, then Khamenei will be hard-pressed to ignore it. That said, the leading principlist figures who could challenge Ahmadinejad in the next election--Ali Larijani, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, and Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf--have been quite on (or have rejected) their possible candidacies. I don't think this necessarily means anything at this point, other than there is not yet a consensus hardline candidate to challenge Ahmadinejad. The only thing that is certain at this point is that there's still a long way to go before we'll know exactly who will and who will not be running in 2009.

Of course, a lot will also depend on who's elected next month in the United States.

[Image: former Majles speaker, Mehdi Karrubi]

Interview with Iran's ambassador to Iraq

The LA Times has published an interview with Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, Iran's ambassador to Baghdad.

Kazemi-Qomi speaks on several issues, including Iran's disapproval of the proposed US status of forces agreement, Iran's historical ties to Iraq, and Iran's current role in Iraqi reconstruction. What I found most interesting, however, was Kazemi-Qomi's comments on Iran's involvement in Iraqi security. Kazemi-Qomi, himself a former Revolutionary Guard, also discusses the role of Qods Force commander, Qassem Soleimani.

Here are a couple excerpts:

Question: Does one country, Iran or the United States, have more influence inside Iraq with the government and political parties?

Ambassador Kazemi-Qomi: The policy of our country is, first, Iraq is an independent and free country, a country which we wish has stability and security. We wish that Iraq has prosperity and progress, that the government is elected by their people, with national unity, and will have the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from its territory. On this policy, we are taking steps with the Iraqi people to support the Iraqi government in the political process and the security process. We support both the security and reconstruction process. We support both the Iraqi people and government within these frameworks.

Question: What has been the role of [Brig.] Gen. Qassem Suleimani [the commander of the Quds Force] in ending Iraq's recent violence involving the Mahdi Army? Iraqi officials credit him with helping pressure [Shiite cleric Muqtada] Sadr to stop fighting first in Basra and then in Sadr City.

Kazemi-Qomi: The policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in its policies and actions are to be part of the solution in Iraq. We played a big role in Iraq's prevailing security. Regarding Qassem Suleimani, he is one of the Iranian officials, and he has responsibility for Iraqi affairs. He has a good relationship with all Iraqi leaders. We support any step to strengthen security in Iraq. We think all parties and countries will support or have to support Iraq's security, reconstruction and stability.

Regarding the Sadrists, this is a political bloc. They have more than 30 lawmakers. We engage all blocs and political groups to help the government and security. . . .

Again, I would like say Suleimani is one of the Iranian officials working under the framework of Iraqi policy. Iraqi leaders are always commenting on the positive role of this man, and he doesn't pay attention others words about him because he plays a positive role in Iraq. The accusations from the Americans are silly accusations and they don't deserve to be commented upon.

[Image: Ambassador Hassan Kazemi-Qomi with Nuri al-Maliki and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad]

Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi in Iraq, meets Sistani

IRNA reports in Persian that hardline cleric, Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, visited Iraq this week.

Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi is one of the most influential clerical leaders in Iran and occupies a powerful position in the Qom seminary. While his visit has gained little coverage elsewhere, Iran is publicizing it as symbol of Iran's growing influence in Iraq.

Though little information was released about his trip, the article highlights Mesbah-Yazdi's meeting with Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf. Sistani has met with Iranian political leaders before (such as Tehran's mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf), but a meeting with Mesbah-Yazdi is intriguing. The two religious leaders differ greatly in their political and religious views, particularly on the issue of clerical involvement in government. Further, Mesbah-Yazdi is tightly connected to the Ahmadinejad regime and the hardline principlist camp.

This makes his visit a tad more significant given Iran's increasing (political, economic, religious, and cultural) presence in southern Iraq and its interests in the Najaf seminary (which Sistani heads). Without any details, not much can be said about the meeting. Yet with Sistani's influence waning in Iraq and Iran's on the rise, the meeting between the two clerics is an interesting (but perhaps minor) development.

[Hardline clerical leader, Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi]

Military leaders on Iran's naval capacities, Basij

Iranian military leaders discussed a variety of topics in a recent Aftab-e Yazd article.

Here are a few important bits:

The longest interview is that of Habibollah Sayyari, the commander of the Iranian armed forces. Sayyari speaks of the navy’s central role in current defense strategies, mentions the various areas of operation (Caspian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Straight of Hormuz, Persian Gulf), and suggests Iran’s naval dominance in those areas. To this end, Sayyari also mentions Iran’s current naval technological capabilities. He suggests that Iran will not be able to rely on its current suppliers if conflict should break out, and argues that Iran needs to manufacture its own military technology to avoid such a scenario.

Sayyari also briefly discusses the IRGC taking over command of the Gulf and Hormuz straight. He emphasizes that both navies will work together, but acknowledges the new division of security details. In this scheme, the regular navy will retain command over the Caspian and Oman Gulf, and the Guards Corps will control the Persian Gulf and Hormuz straight.

The article also has a short interview with Yahya Rahim Safavi—former IRGC commander and current military adviser to the Supreme Leader. Safavi discusses the current changes to the IRGC command structure and says that these changes are mostly aimed at strengthening the Basij force and giving it a greater role in the IRGC’s operations (something I’ve discussed before). Safavi says that the Guards increased provincial presence—through the Basij—will help them better protect the principles of the revolution.

[Yahya Rahim Safavi, top military adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader]